

14 March 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Basic Intelligence Group  
Chief, Current Intelligence Group  
Chief, Staff Intelligence Group  
Chief, Global Survey Group  
Chief, Economics Group  
Chief, Transportation Group  
Chief, International Organizations Group  
Chief, Each Regional Branch  
Chief, Map Branch  
Assistant Director, Office of Scientific  
Intelligence (for information)

SUBJECT: Intelligence Production Requirements

1. Under the provisions of paragraph 5 a of ORE Operating Procedure No. 29, dated 28 February 1949, the Plans and Policy Staff was charged with responsibility for coordinating the formulation of national intelligence production requirements.

2. The need for formulation of such production requirements has long been recognized within ORE. Attempts at formulation undertaken individually by almost every component of ORE have met with only limited success. ORE has been able, through such efforts, to achieve from time to time a general concept of the intelligence which, in its opinion, had to be produced in order to satisfy the requirements of national policy and security. Nevertheless, ORE could never be sure that its concepts were entirely valid without balancing them against the direct and continuous expression of intelligence needs of top level policy and strategic planning agencies. This expression of needs has never been available on a steady basis. As a result, ORE has in most cases produced national intelligence by reliance on its own imagination, rather than by direction of the nation's policy makers and planners.

3. In addition to disturbing ORE, this situation has caused concern in the very highest quarters, as evidenced in the following extract from Chapter II of the Eberstadt Committee Report:

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"Plans and decisions affecting national security are presently made at various places; by the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, by the State Department, and by the military services individually..... If CIA is to perform adequately its function of evaluating and correlating intelligence relating to the national security, it must be aware of, and participate in, the thinking at all those levels."

4. As the first of a series of measures designed to correlate ORE production more closely with the recurring needs of the using agencies, it has been thought advisable for ORE to draw up a tentative over-all list of national intelligence production requirements. When completed, this list will be transmitted to the NSC and other policy and operational planning bodies for recommendations, additions, and designation of priorities. It is hoped that such a list, by bringing together not only the ideas of intelligence producers but also the needs of intelligence users, will for the first time furnish an agreed framework upon which ORE can plan its production.

5. Some explanation of the term "intelligence production requirement", as used here and in ORE Operating Procedure No. 29, would perhaps be helpful. An intelligence production requirement is the statement of a need for intelligence production for a specific purpose, expressed in definite, as opposed to general, terms. An intelligence production requirement can be the expression of need for an estimate on a single topic or situation. It can be an expression of need for several estimates treating of varied aspects of one problem. It can also be the expression of need for either an irregular or recurrent series of papers on a continuing problem. In all cases, however, an intelligence production requirement should be specific as to subject, and unequivocal as to terms of reference. Any confusion of an intelligence production requirement with a national intelligence objective, as commonly known, should be avoided. National intelligence objectives are already familiar, and are too broad to be used other than as general guides for deducing intelligence production requirements.

6. In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is requested that you prepare, with respect to your field of responsibility, a list of intelligence production requirements, for transmittal to the Plans and Policy Staff of ORE by 29 March 1949.

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7. When drawing up this list it is suggested that the following points be kept in mind:


a. Production requirements should be formulated in terms of total national security requirements for intelligence and without regard to your component's production capability, the availability of adequate source material, or the capabilities, competence, or field of responsibility of other intelligence agencies. Only in this way will intelligence production requirements bear a fully adequate relation to existing national security problems.

b. Short, intermediate, and long-range production requirements should all be listed, irrespective of monthly or quarterly production goals. It is especially in the long-range category that we can best give to, and receive guidance from, the policy making and strategic planning agencies.

c. Priority designation should be an integral part of each intelligence production requirement that is listed.

8. After receipt of intelligence production requirements from all components of ORE, the Plans and Policy Staff will coordinate and consolidate them into a single list for consideration of the IPB. Subsequent to IPB approval, the list will be circulated to appropriate intelligence, policy and strategic planning agencies of the government for review and recommendations. Upon final adoption of the CIA Intelligence Production Requirements, they will be utilized for the preparation of the CIA Intelligence Production Plan and issued as guidance to all field collection and source exploitation facilities of CIA and the IAC agencies.

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Assistant Director  
Reports and Estimates

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
MAR 15 1949 DATE		
TO: <i>Aolou</i>		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	
REMARKS:  <i>Clu</i>		
FROM: <del>INFO. CONTROL DIVISION/OK</del>		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8  
SEP 1946